4th
Canadian Division at the Ypres Salient, August 1916
“During these days our Patrols
exhibited great keenness, working well and bombing enemy parties and
works. A good beginning.”[1]
-Brigadier General Victor
Odlum
O.C., 11th
Canadian Infantry Brigade
In the depths of
August, very little change in situation along the Ypres Salient was
appreciable. Opposing lines remained,
more or less, as they had been following the “hard and determined fighting”[2]
over Mount Sorrel in June. A major
difference in the latter weeks of 1916’s summer was that the Canadians had
mostly gone. Sandwiched between two
British Divisions and borrowing Australian artillery until their own gunners were
properly equipped was the 4th Canadian Division; given a patch of
land to defend where not quite much of anything was expected to happen. This was a very good thing, as long as it turned
out to be the case. 4th
Division, the last complete unit of its size Canada would put into the field,
would require time to come to terms with the practicalities of war.
Their inexperience was
something only exposure could resolve.
Within ten days of arriving in France, many battalions of 4th
Division’s brigades (10, 11, and 12 Canadian Infantry Brigades) were operating
on the front line, after having gone through trench rotations under supervision
of more veteran outfits.
Examining official
reports of this period, the shocking naivety is quite clear. War diary entries are far more brief and
appended to far less frequently than contemporary records from other divisions. There is no disservice to the 4th
Division’s administrators in this observation, as a similar brevity is found in
the early entries of each preceding division.
Very noticeably, particular care was made to mention individuals, even
private soldiers, by name. It would not
be long before these records, by necessity of practicality, would shed the
brevity of sparse detail and the sentimentality of using proper names. In effect, this lack of narrative detail is a
bane to history and only seems to support the notion that nothing of interest
occurred between the end of June to the reassignment of the Canadian Corps to
the Somme in September.
A fair few daily
reports and diary entries noting “situation normal” or no change”- even resorting
to the shortest of shorthand “do.”- offer little to narrative history. It should be kept in mind, however, that holding
a defensive position is by no means and idle task, nor without a whispered
presence of peril.
What could be said
about the 4th Division’s introduction to trench warfare in the last
week of August 1916, is that of all things they may learn, one of the most
critical was that many events were beyond the ability of the individual to
control. Sometimes in such
circumstances, there might not be opportunity to learn from error. A fraction of a second’s inattentiveness could
be one’s last. Soon enough, it would
become apparent that no amount of preparation or caution was sufficient to
counter random events.
Lieutenant Dean Stanley
Bartle would unwittingly prove to be an example of this harsh lesson. A banker from Niagara Falls, Lt. Bartle came
to France with the 75th Battalion, arriving on the 14th
of August as part of 11th Brigade.
Ten days later, and less than a full day into his first front line
rotation, he was dead.[3] His death is noteworthy, as he was the first
fatal casualty among the officers in the Brigade.[4] Lt. Bartle’s departure- alive and in good
health in his last morning; shattered out of existence that evening- would have
been a rude shock to his men and his mess-mates. In a flat-handed smack of how real this
adventure had just become, Lt. Bartle could now stand as a proof of the indifference
of mortality.
The 4th
Division’s learning curve of front line operations could have no grace period,
and the Germans were certainly not inclined to grant one. On the morning of 26 August, a working party
from ‘A’ Company, 46th Battalion was returning to billets from
overnight repair work on the trenched when “the party was caught by M.G. fire
in the entrance to Poppy Lane, and two men were wounded….They were in rear of
party and were not missed. When day
broke they were seen from the fire trench, and four men of ‘C’ Company
volunteered to bring them in from their position in the open. This was carried out without casualties, and
the four men are to be commended for their bravery.”[5]
The following day, an
explosion tore through a portion of the line held by the 47th
Battalion, wounding Quartermaster Sergeant McInnes and Private Legg. No Germans were involved in this. A court of inquiry held on the same day found
the explosion to have been caused by “accidental discharge of a mills grenade
due to careless handling of same by Pte. Legg.”[6]
Trenches were not the
only element in defensive war. Craters
left from detonated mines and heavy artillery were coveted, ready-made
positions littering the lunar scape of no man’s land. Brigadier General Odlum’s remarks on his
brigade’s “keenness” in patrolling refer directly to this. Lieutenant McQuarie,
Sergeant Hanly and their scouting party of 54th Battalion men
discovered that the Germans had been making use of one such impression
nicknamed “Crater No. 2”. On the night
of 26 August, they encountered two enemy soldiers who were quick to flee the
scene. “The crater,” it was reported, “was
found to be partially fortified.”[7] German
intentions were unclear. They could have
been establishing an observation post or they may have been preparing to use
Crater No. 2 as a jumping-off point for a raid or local offensive. The next night, armed with this information,
Lt. McQuarie and his scouts went out again, where they “made a thorough reconnaissance
of our wire and listening posts.”[8] Nothing could be left to chance to allow the
enemy to go unobserved or unobstructed.
To be doubly certain, Lt. McQuarie established four additional listening
posts in the vicinity.
Vigilance was
prudent. On the 28th, close to
midnight, the Germans sprung from crater No. 2 and attempted to dislodge men of
the 75th Battalion holding Crater No. 1.[9] This demonstration caused no casualties and
came to nothing; being driven back the way they had come with brisk rifle
fire. A group of men from the 75th
were quick to act, going against Crater No. 2 with bombs of their own,
returning to friendly lines without suffering any casualties.[10]
Meanwhile, the men most
responsible for the marred surface between lines were steadily at their
work. Artillery, though sporadic, was a
daily occurrence, with the Germans making a hefty counterbattery attempt on the
Division’s guns- 4th Australian Divisional Artillery- on the 28th.[11] Major Davis’ 3rd Tunnelling
Company, who had been on task in the area consistently, were making efforts to
push their mines forward while simultaneously destroying those of the enemy;
packing and firing a small countermine of 800lbs ammonal in the small hours of
the 29th.[12]
Germans, however, were
not the only threat to the trench lines.
In the struggle to keep them in good condition, the climate could be
equally diabolical. A long, hot and
mostly dry summer came to an end in the last days of August. In the sodden bottom lands of Flanders, two
days of “extremely wet” weather was sufficient to leave “trenches in frightful
condition.” Relieving the 54th
Battalion at the firing line on 30 August, the 102nd Battalion came
into “mud (liquid) knee deep-Bath mats,”-wood pallets used as footboards- “in
Communication Trenches not being anchored- floating. Wet weather breaking down trenches in many
places.”[13]
These circumstances,
always dangerous, often deadly, were what passed for a report of “situation
normal” in the tail end of an “uneventful” summer in the Salient.[i]
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[1] War Diary Entry, 11th Canadian Infantry
Brigade, 31 August 1916
[3] Dossier, Military Records, Bartle, D.S., Lieut.
[4] War Diary Entry, 11th Canadian Infantry
Brigade, 24 August 1916
[5] War Diary Entry, 46th Battalion, 26 August
1916
[6] War Diary Entry, 47th Battalion, 27 August
1916
[7] War Diary Entry, 54th Battalion, 26 August
1916
[i] All Primary Sources Cited, and Information Used to
Construct this Article is due to the courtesy of Library and Archives Canada.
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